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The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the largest Department of Defense 
(DoD) military aircraft acquisition program to date.  The JSF will serve the Air Force, 
Navy and Marine Corps, as well as many of our key international allies.  In 1998, the 
DoD initiated the JSF alternate engine program in an effort to achieve cost savings, 
performance improvements, and other non-tangible benefits, similar to those achieved 
during the F-16 Great Engine War.   
Congress has periodically debated the pros and cons of the JSF alternate engine 
program, coming to no real consensus on the topic.  The most recent debate coincided 
with the FY2007 budget request, which resulted in the proposed cancellation and 
elimination of funding for the F136 program.  While Congress eventually restored the 
majority of the program’s funding for that year, the DoD has again proposed elimination 
of the program in its FY2008 budget proposal.  With a program of this magnitude, the 
savings and performance benefits to be gained are significant.  Before DoD decides to 
terminate the alternate engine program, a thorough and unbiased analysis should be 
performed to weigh the costs and benefits of the second engine program. 
This thesis is a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of the costs, benefits, issues, and 
effects associated with maintaining the JSF’s alternate engine program.  It compares the 
dual-source and sole-source scenarios with regard to the development, production, and 
life-cycle sustainment of the JSF engine.  The study also explores past DoD engine 
acquisition programs, including the highly successful dual-sourced F-16/F-15 engine, to 
establish a precedent for the potential monetary and non-monetary savings that can result 
from competition.  Finally, the thesis examines the non-quantitative impacts the 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. SUBJECT OF THIS BUSINESS CASE  
This thesis is a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of the costs, benefits, issues, and 
effects associated with maintaining the JSF’s alternate engine program.  It compares the 
dual-source and sole-source scenarios with regard to the development, production, and 
life-cycle sustainment of the JSF engine.  The study also explores past DoD engine 
acquisition programs, including the highly successful dual-sourced F-16/F-15 engine, to 
establish a precedent for the potential monetary and non-monetary savings that can result 
from competition.  Finally, the BCA examines the non-quantitative impacts the 
program’s cancellation will have on the DoD, its allies, and the industrial base. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1.  Joint Strike Fighter Program Description 
Much of today’s U.S. fighter inventory consists of aircraft developed and 
produced in the 1970s.  Service-life exhaustion combined with escalating threats have 
resulted in all three services slowly retiring their current fighter aircraft.  The British 
Harrier fleet, which first flew more than 30 years ago, is encountering similar problems.  
(Fulghum & Butler, 2006)  The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is being tagged to replace the 
aging aircraft, while also supporting the expanding requirements of a modern-day tactical 
fighter.  Specifically, the U.S. Air Force will employ it as a multi-role aircraft to replace 
the F-16 and A-10, and complement the F-22.  The U.S. Navy will use it as a “first day of 
war” strike fighter aircraft to complement the F/A-18E/F.  The Marine Corps will use the 
Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35 variant to replace the AV-8B and 
F/A-18A/C/D.  The United Kingdom’s Royal Navy and Royal Air Force will use the 
multi-role aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR7.  
The origin of the JSF dates back to 1993 when a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of the 
Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) and Advanced Strike Aircraft (A/F-X) programs concluded 




affordable.  Both programs were cancelled, and in their place the BUR initiated the Joint 
Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program.  The goal of JAST was to establish the 
building blocks for the affordable development of the next-generation strike weapons 
system.  After a review of the JAST program in 1995, the DoD dropped the “T” in JAST 
and the JSF program began to emerge.  Continuing to grow, the JSF program was merged 
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Advanced Short Take-
off and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) program in 1995.  The United Kingdom (UK), 
which was already collaborating on the DARPA ASTOVL program, joined the JSF 
program.  In the years following, the JSF program grew to its current status as the DoD’s 
largest military aircraft acquisition program to date.  It is a joint, multinational program 
involving the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners, including 
the UK, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Turkey, and Australia.   
The vision of the JSF program is to “deliver and sustain the most advanced, 
affordable strike fighter aircraft to protect the future generations worldwide.”  (461 
FLTS, 2006, p.3)  The single-seat, single-engine aircraft is being designed to operate by 
itself or as part of a multi-platform operation.  It will be able to rapidly transition between 
air-to-surface and air-to-air missions while still airborne.  The design includes three 
variants: a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant for the Air Force; a carrier 
variant (CV) for the Navy; and a STOVL variant for the Marine Corps and UK.  The JSF 
is being designed to meet a wide range of operational requirements.  One of these 
requirements is an extended combat radius which will allow the pilot to be less dependent 
on air refueling and have significantly greater time on station.  Table 1.  lists some of the 
other Key Performance Parameters (KPP) of the F-35.  The requirement differences 
between the variants are primarily due to the differences in their missions.  For example, 
the STOVL variant will have a slightly shorter range because some of the space used to 
carry fuel is used instead to house the lift fan of the STOVL propulsion system.  The 
main differences in the carrier variant are associated with carrier operations.  For example 
its internal structure is very strong to withstand the high loading of catapult-assisted 





larger wing and tailcontrol surfaces for low speed approaches to the carrier.  Larger 
leading edge flaps and foldable wingtip sections provide a larger wing area for increased 
range and payload capacity. 
 
Table 1.   JSF Key Performance Parameters 
KPP USMC USAF USN UK 
Radio Frequency Signature Low Observable 
Combat Radius (nautical miles) 450 nm 590 nm 600 nm 450 nm 
Sortie Generation (Surge / 
Sustained) 
4 / 3 3 / 2 3 / 2 3 / 2 
Logistics Footprint < 8 C-17 
equivalent loads 
< 8 C-17 
equivalent 
loads 
< 46,000 cu ft < 21,000 cu ft 
Mission Reliability 95% 93% 95% 95% 
Interoperability Meet 100% of critical, top-level Information Exchange Requirements 
Secure Voice and Data 
Vertical Lift Bring Back 2 x 1K JDAM,  
2 x AIM-120 
with reserve fuel 
N/A N/A 2 x 1K JDAM,  
2 x AIM-120 
with reserve 
fuel 
Maximum Approach Speed N/A N/A 145 knots N/A 
From:  GAO-06-391, 2006. 
 
2.  Joint Strike Fighter Propulsion Acquisition 
The future financial investment potential of the JSF propulsion system is 
significant considering the number of aircraft engines and spare parts to be purchased, 
along with lifetime support to sustain the engines.  It is expected that the DoD will 
develop, procure, and maintain over 2,443 JSF aircraft of the program’s life-cycle.  This 
doesn’t include the 2,000 to 3,500 additional aircraft expected in international sales.  
(Sullivan, 2007)  Given the scope of the program’s potential, Congress first expressed 
concern over a lack of engine competition on the JSF program at the fiscal year (FY) 
1996 defense authorization conference.  In that year, Congress directed the DoD to 
ensure the program “provides for adequate engine competition.”  Then in FY1998 it 
further directed the DoD to certify that “the Joint Strike Fighter Program contains 
sufficient funding to carry out an alternate engine development program that includes 
flight qualification of an alternate engine in a joint strike fighter airframe.”  (Bolkcom, 




In 1998, and again in 2002, DoD program management advisory groups 
conducted studies to determine the advantages and disadvantages for the alternate engine 
program.  In both years the advisory groups determined that “developing an alternate JSF 
engine had significant benefits in the areas of contractor responsiveness, industrial base, 
aircraft readiness, and international participation.”  (Sullivan, 2007, p.3)  The advisory 
groups also reported finding marginal benefits in the areas of cost savings and the ability 
to make future engine improvements.   
In August 2005, DoD awarded a $2.1 billion contract to the General Electric (GE) 
and Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team (FET) for the development and demonstration of 
an alternate engine system, designated the F136.  The requirement is for the F135 and 
F136 engines to be physically and functionally interchangeable.  They will share 
common modules, such as the exhaust and lift system, and will use many of the same 
components.  All three JSF aircraft variants will be able to use either engine.  The F136 
development program, which lags the F135 program by approximately five years, will be 
ready for procurement competition beginning in the year 2013.  (Amick, 2005) 
The competitive sourcing strategy for the JSF engine was succinctly summarized 
by Michael Sullivan, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the 
Government Accountability Office as follows:   
According to current JSF program plans, beginning in fiscal year 2007, the 
program office will award the first of three annual production contracts to 
Pratt & Whitney for its F135 engine.  In fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 
noncompetitive contracts will be awarded to both Pratt & Whitney and to 
the Fighter Engine Team for the F136 engine.  Beginning in fiscal year 
2012, contracts will be awarded on an annual basis under a competitive 
approach for quantities beyond each contractor’s minimum sustaining rate.  
Full-rate production for the program begins in fiscal year 2014 and is 
expected to continue though fiscal year 2034.  (Sullivan, 2007, p.4) 
Congress has periodically debated the pros and cons of the JSF alternate engine 
program, coming to no real consensus on the topic.  The most recent debate coincided 
with the FY2007 budget request, which resulted in the proposed cancellation and 




majority of the program’s funding for that year, the DoD has again proposed elimination 
of the program in its FY2008 budget proposal.  The advocates of the cancellation cite a 
savings of $1.8 billion over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) with little operational 
risk.  Critics argue that the cancellation decision is being driven by immediate budget 
pressures rather than an analysis of the long term positive and negative aspects of the 
program.  Supporting the claim, Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, is reported 
to have said that “the idea of canceling the F136 came up during the QDR, in the course 
of attempts to identify ways to save costs at the Pentagon.”  (Bolkcom, 2006, p.2)   
3.  Pratt & Whitney F135 Engine Description 
The F135 engine, which is being developed specifically for the JSF, is an 
evolution of the F119-PW-100 turbofan engine that currently powers the F-22 Raptor.  It 
integrates the proven F119 core with a high-performance six-stage compressor, single-
stage turbine unit and new low-pressure stool.  It also features an advanced prognostic 
and on-condition management system that provides “maintenance awareness, autonomic 
logistic support, and automatic field data and test systems.”  (P&W, 2007) 
The engine is currently in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
phase.  The first CTOL F135 engine test occurred in October 2003 and the first STOVL 
engine test followed in April 2004.  The first flight of the CTOL-variant JSF aircraft, 
powered by the F135 engine, took place in December 2006.  To date, over 2,000 hours 
have been accumulated on the F135 test engines.  (P&W, 2007) 
The F135 engine represents a maintenance-focused design.  According to the 
company’s website, the engine has approximately 40 percent fewer parts, which 
improves the engine’s supportability, maintainability, and reliability.  In addition, all line-
replaceable components (LRCs) on the engine can be removed and replaced with a set of 
six common hand tools.  Finally, the F135 has a 50 percent lower infrastructure support 






4.  General Electric / Rolls Royce F136 Engine Description 
The F136 engine, which lags the F135 in development by approximately five 
years, has had the advantage of being able to design the engine to match as closely as 
possible the final aircraft configuration.  The F136 engine consists of a three-stage fan, 
five-stage compressor, a three-stage low-pressure turbine section, single-stage high-
pressure turbine, and a radial augmentor.  The F136 team is cooperating with the F135 
team in the development of common propulsion system components.   
The first F136 CTOL engine was successfully tested in July 2004 and testing on 
the first F136 STOVL engine began in Feb 2005.  First flight of the F136 engine on a 
joint strike fighter aircraft is planned for 2009.  (GE, 2007)   
The F136 engine is being jointly developed by GE and Rolls-Royce.  In 2002, the 
two companies formed the “Fighter Engine Team” company.  Its charter is to develop, 
deploy, and support the F136 engine for the JSF program.  GE, which has responsibility 
for 60 percent of the engine program, is developing the compressor, coupled turbine, 
controls and accessories, structures, and the augmentor.  Rolls-Royce, with 40 percent of 
the program, is responsible for the fan, combustor, low-pressure turbines and gear boxes.  
(GE, 2007)   
C.   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses a cost-benefit structure to examine and compare the quantitative 
and non-quantitative factors involved.  The financial costs are compared using life-cycle 
cost analysis adjusted for the time value of money.  Sources of data include the JSF joint 
program office, congressional budget data, data collected through government-sponsored 
assessments, contractor provided data, and historical data from other relevant engine 
acquisition programs.  Data collected are analyzed with the intent of quantitatively 
comparing, where possible, the costs and benefits of the alternate engine program.  





D.   GOVERNING MANDATES 
To achieve the goals of affordability, supportability, and safety, the JSF program 
intends to use a combination of competition, contract incentives, and performance-based 
logistics (PBL) to reduce engine operating and support costs.  The DoD has entered into 
numerous PBL contracts in recent years, including on the C-17 and F/A-18 programs, 
and intends to use PBL extensively in the JSF program.  (Ahern, 2007) 
As directed by the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military 
departments have adopted a performance based logistics (PBL) strategy to increase 
weapon system readiness through the use of integrated logistics chains and public/private 
partnerships.  To facilitate “best value” assessments of product support strategies on new 
and legacy systems, the office of the Undersecretary of Defense developed a set of 
consistent BCA guidelines to be used when assessing product support strategies.  These 
guidelines were used in this assessment of the alternate engine program to support the 
Joint Strike Fighter.  The BCA guiding principles applied in this study are listed below.  
(USD(AT&L), 2004) 
• All BCAs will be based on warfighter-stated performance requirement(s), 
documented in Performance Based Agreements (PBAs).   
• BCAs will be conducted to assess changes from existing product support 
strategies for legacy systems and to support the product support strategy for 
new weapon systems.  Over time, BCAs will need to be updated or repeated to 
validate the approach taken to support future plans.   
• BCAs will evaluate all services or activities needed to meet warfighter 
performance requirements using “best value” assessments.  Best value is the 
expected outcome that, in the Department’s consideration, provides the 
greatest overall benefit in response to requirements.  The assessments will 
include cost per output, performance measures, life cycle costs, and risk 
management.  The value added in terms of benefits and outcomes of all 




• BCAs will continue through the life cycle process with oversight to ensure 
reassessment at appropriate trigger points, including life cycle costs (LCC) 
updates; Reduced-Total Ownership Costs activities; and/or continuous 
improvements actions.  The Military Services will evaluate product support 
strategy performance at appropriate decision points.   
• The cost and performance baselines for legacy systems will be determined by 
historic experience and costs.  The cost baseline will include all appropriate 
government and/or contractor costs, including indirect costs, overhead, and 
handling fees.   
• BCAs will include risk assessment of expected performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, and surge capabilities.  Consideration of performance and cost 
risk will explicitly consider contract versus organic risk management, 
financial accountability, and recovery actions.  The risk assessment should 
address the probability of and confidence level of the following events 
occurring: poor performance, and cost growth.   
• BCAs will be developed using information provided by all appropriate 
product support stakeholders, including government and industry providers.  
In order to maintain a competitive environment, industry participation will be 
determined in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).   




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Sourcing strategy has been a frequent topic of research over the years.  In 
examining these studies, the one clear conclusion is that there is not one clear answer.  
There is no panacea.  But there does appear to be agreement that the most effective 
sourcing strategy is dependent on the characteristics and scope of the program, and the 
specific contractors involved.  In this section, research comparing sole-source, multiple 
sourcing, and parallel sourcing strategies is presented in an attempt to draw out general 
trends and situational factors that may aid in the examination of sourcing for the JSF 
engine.  But first, a real-world and particularly relevant example is presented regarding 
the first Great Engine War between GE and Pratt & Whitney.  For all practical purposes, 
the competition strategy used in that engine program is considered a success, despite the 
fact that it has not been repeated in the acquisition of any other engine or major weapon 
system.  The Great Engine War case study is juxtaposed with the JSF program to reveal 
the many similarities and lessons learned that should be useful in making the decision to 
adopt or cancel the JSF alternate engine program.   
B.  F-16 PROPULSION ACQUISITION–THE GREAT ENGINE WAR 
1. Background 
In March 1970, after a rigorous source selection process, Pratt & Whitney was 
awarded the contract to design, develop, and test the F100 engine for the Air Force’s F-
15 aircraft.  Pratt & Whitney was chosen over GE in large part because it was felt the 
company had a better understanding of the engine/inlet compatibility phenomena that had 
been plaguing the F-111 at the time.  Then in 1975, the Air Force selected General 
Dynamics to produce the F-16.  Since the Air Force planned to power the F-16 with Pratt 
& Whitney’s F100 engine, it found itself completely dependent on Pratt & Whitney for 




Initially the F100 engine was well received by pilots who particularly liked the 
maneuverability, acceleration, and rate of climb the F-100 engines afforded them.  But as 
the flying hours accumulated, major problems began to arise.  The two most significant 
were “stall stagnation” and short life-cycles with high maintenance costs.  Stall 
stagnation occurred under certain operating conditions and required pilots to shut down 
and restart the engine in flight.  While this was a danger in the two-engine F-15, it was a 
significant safety of flight issue in the single-engine F-16.  Additionally, the engine’s 
short cycle time between depot overhauls and high maintenance requirements drove up 
its operating costs.  (Camm, 1993)   
In his book, The Air Force and the Great Engine War, R.W. Drewes (1987) 
characterized Pratt & Whitney’s reaction to the Air Force’s attempts to get the problems 
with the F100 engines resolved as “stubborn resistance.”  The Air Force’s perception was 
that Pratt & Whitney was “more interested in generating profits through contract changes 
than in making the engine perform properly.”  (Drewes, 1987, p.55)  The company 
contended that they were under no contractual obligation to fix the problems since the 
F100 had been designed and qualified to the Air Force’s specifications.  If the Air Force 
wanted to add requirements to improve performance, those changes represented an 
additional tasking and were subject to additional charge.  Although Pratt & Whitney did 
slowly improve the F100, it was still unreliable and costly to operate and maintain.  
Relations between the Air Force and Pratt & Whitney deteriorated quickly and the Air 
Force began looking for alternative solutions.   
In a RAND study comparing the two engines, author F. Camms (1993) described 
the problems GE was facing during the same time period.  It had lost out to Pratt & 
Whitney in the competitions to provide engines for the F-14, F-15, and F-16; leaving the 
company essentially locked out of the U.S. market for fighter engines.  In 1975, in a last-
ditch effort to get back in the market, GE used its own funds to develop a demonstrator 
engine called the F101X.  The company hoped to use the engine to persuade the Navy to 





interested.  It was exactly what they were looking for—a possible alternative to the F100 
and, more importantly, a potential threat they could use to get better performance out of 
Pratt & Whitney.  (Camm, 1993) 
The Alternate Fighter Engine competition was officially launched, once again 
pitting Pratt & Whitney against GE.  Throughout the competition, according to Camms, 
Pratt & Whitney maintained is attitude of defiance, while GE strove to be a responsive as 
possible to the Air Force’s needs.  On February 3, 1984 the decision was announced—a 
split award, 75 percent (or 120 engines) to GE and 25 percent (or 40 engines) to Pratt & 
Whitney.  In addition, this represented only the first year’s buy.  The Air Force would re-
compete the contract each year, allowing contractors to improve the terms of their offers 
on a wide variety of factors. 
In a press release, the Air Force stated that GE had offered “lower overall support 
costs, had ensured better procurement of spare parts through an outstanding plan for 
second sourcing and re-procurement of engine components, and had offered an excellent 
warranty. “  (Drewes, 1987, p.126)  In essence, GE had been more responsive to the Air 
Force’s requirements.  But even more significant was that both contractors’ proposals 
brought substantial benefits to the engine program in the areas of engine operability, 
supportability, and performance.  The new engines would be warranted to be twice as 
durable as the current F100, free from rapid-throttle-movement worries and from 
afterburner flameouts, and almost completely relieved from needing extensive ground 
trimming.  In addition, support costs were expected to decrease by 50 percent.  (Drewes, 
1987) 
Although typical development issues arose throughout the years, both 
development programs produced engines that operated as expected, on schedule, and 
without cost overruns.  The annual competitions brought improvements in many areas, 
most notably a 30-50 percent reduction in cost per flight hour, maintenance man-hours, 
and engine removals per 1000 flight-hours.  (Camm, 1993)  Operational benefits included 
unrestricted throttle movement, improved war-time surge capability, improved thrust, and 




shifted to the Air Force, allowing it to get many contractual changes at no cost to itself or 
to trade one change for another on more favorable terms.   
2. Research Studies of the Great Engine War 
In his Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis titled, “The Next Great Engine 
War: Analysis and Recommendations for Managing the Joint Strike Fighter Engine 
Competition”, Karl Amick conducted a review of the research studies done in the years 
following the Great Engine War in an effort to apply the lessons learned to future engine 
competitions.  His research centered on six representative studies.  He found that while 
each study had a slightly different focus, they all concluded that competition was the 
“right thing to do.”  Amick highlights the following themes across the six studies: 
• The competition was a great success 
• Cost savings was not a factor in the success 
• Competition improved manufacturer responsiveness 
• Competition should be pursued in future acquisition programs 
For the most part, the studies he examined were unanimous in all categories 
except cost savings.  Amick’s findings are summarized in Table 2.  Error! Reference 












Table 2.   Summary of Research Studies on the Great Engine War 
Summary of Studies 
Successful 
Competition? Cost Saving? Responsiveness? 
Future 
Applications? 
Reports Yes No Large Small Inconclusive Improved Unimproved Yes No 
Metamorphosis of Business 
Strategies and Air Force 
Acquisition Policies in the 
Aerospace Propulsion 
Industry:  Case Study of 
the “Great Engine War” 
(Jon Steven Ogg) 
√  √ √   √ 
The Air Force and the 
Great Engine War (Robert 
W. Drewes, Col, USAF) 
√ √  √  √  
Analysis of the Air Force 
and the Great Engine War 
(Victoria Mayes) 
√  √ √  √  
Alternate Fighter Engines 
Competition Study (Jeffrey 
A. Hoover) 
√ √  √  √  
The Development of the 
F100-PW-220 and F110-
GE-100 Engines: A Case 
Study of the Risk 
Assessment and Risk 
Management (Frank 
Camm) 
√  √ √  √  
Fighter Engine 
Competition: A Study of 
Factors Affecting Unit 
Price (Brian R. Leginus) 
√  √ √  √  
From:  Amick, 2005.   
 
3. Lessons Learned and General Observations 
The following lessons learned and general observations can be made regarding 
the Great Engine War between GE and Pratt & Whitney:   
Maintaining competition, as the Air Force did in this case, may not always be 
possible.  Competition will work best on programs with high total volume over the life of 
the program and high annual production rates.  These factors are necessary in order to 




where the cost of single versus multiple sources is equal, will vary depending on the 
program and the contractors involved.  (Drewes, 1987) 
Competition shifts the balance of risk in a development program.  In essence, it 
shifts the perceived risk away from the government and onto the contractors.  With each 
contract competition, the government can redistribute market share among the 
contractors, thus increasing the contractors’ risks while at the same time decreasing the 
government’s risk by reducing its dependence of under-performing contractors.  (Camm, 
1993) 
Competition can increase contractor responsiveness to government or military 
service needs.  GE demonstrated this during the first year production competition.  In 
addition, when unexpected events occur, the government can expect greater success in 
getting an attractive settlement, thereby reducing the probability and size of negative 
effects of contractor performance.  (Camms, 1993) 
Competition reduces the likelihood of opportunistic or exploitive behavior on the 
part of the contractor.  This creates a lower risk situation for the government, thereby 
reducing the cost of monitoring contract compliance.  While it does not completely 
eliminate the need for monitoring, it greatly simplifies it and allows for more flexible and 
creative program management.  (Camm, 1993) 
While the use of competition discourages opportunistic contractor behavior, it 
does not completely eliminate it.  In the case of the Great Engine War, it became clear to 
the contractors that the Air Force valued competition enough that it was not willing to 
withdraw completely from its relationship with either GE or Pratt & Whitney.  In effect, 
both contractors came to realize that they could engage in some opportunistic behavior 
without fear of the Air Force withdrawing entirely.  An example of this occurred during 
the first year production competition when Pratt & Whitney priced its offer to strongly 
encourage the Air Force to buy all of its engines from Pratt & Whitney.  It accomplished 
this by setting it pricing scale in such a way that any engines purchased from GE would 




price too.  In order to keep the competition going and keep both contractors under 
pressure, the Air Force ended up accepting the increase in price.  (Camm, 1993) 
Competition is not without costs.  In the Great Engine War, full-scale 
development of two engines essentially doubled the cost to the government of creating 
the capability.  While certain economies were created by the competition, they did not 
fully offset the costs incurred in developing two engines.  The real financial benefits 
come during the production lifespan.  (Camm, 1993) 
4. Key Differences between JSF and F-16 Engine Acquisitions 
Can the success achieved during the Great Engine War be repeated on the JSF 
program?  The programs have many similarities.  For example, both the JSF and F-16 
programs have the advantage of high domestic and international sales volume.  This 
contributes significantly to each programs’ affordability.  When it comes to choosing the 
most beneficial acquisition strategy for the JSF engine, however, decision makers should 
pay careful attention to the differences between the programs.  In his master’s thesis, 
Amick (2005) discusses the key differences between the programs and the potential 
positive and/or negative impacts of each.  These are summarized below.   
The Great Engine War was born out of dissatisfaction with Pratt & Whitney’s 
performance on the F100 engine contract.  The JSF engine competition, on the other 
hand, was congressionally mandated from the outset.  Each contractor has been able to 
plan accordingly, and in the end, without the same motivations that drove the Great 
Engine War, contractor responsiveness to the services’ needs may be lacking.   
The JSF requirement is for engines that are physically and functionally 
interchangeable.  This was not the case on the F-15 and F-16 programs.  The net effect 
may be a reduction in number of performance gains as the two competitors no longer feel 
the “performance race” pressure they did during the Great Engine War.  On the JSF 
program, the two competitors will need to cooperate with each other to extent much 
greater than they did in the past engine war.  This will surely stunt performance growth 




The development of the two JSF engines has been referred to as “Coopetition”--
an amalgamation capturing the ideas of the cooperation of the two companies in design 
integration and then, later, the competition when production begins.  This may have the 
net positive effect of reducing the development cost of the F136 since its design will be 
finalized after both the F135 and aircraft designs have been stabilized.   
Since the two engines will be physically and functionally interchangeable, only 
one support system will be required to meet the customer’s maintenance, supply, and 
training needs.  In fact, all the Lockheed Martin flight-line support equipment is already 
designed to support both engines.  This reduces the logistic impact of having two engines 
for the same aircraft.  It also allows the customer (the government) to easily transition 
from one engine variant to the other.  In essence this means there will be a little to no 
switching cost to go from one engine to the other.   
The JSF engines will be the first with onboard Prognostic and Health 
Management sensors, allowing maintainers to predict engine component failure and react 
proactively.  This capability will improve aircraft availability and help streamline 
maintenance efforts.  This will have the positive effect of reducing the engines’ 
development risk and support costs.   
C.   COMPETITIVE VERSUS SOLE-SOURCE PROCUREMENTS 
1. Competing Points of View 
The most obvious take away from the research comparing source strategies is that 
there is much disagreement regarding the advantages of competitive sourcing.  When it 
comes to choosing a sourcing strategy, the tradeoff is between the benefits gained from 
competition and the costs associated with having multiple sources.  The benefits of 
competition include the potential for lower price, improved quality, and competitive 
pressures that speed the learning process.  On the other hand, the costs of utilizing 
multiple sources include tooling and start-up costs at the second facility, diminished 
economies of scale resulting from split purchases, and a possible slowdown in learning-




W. Edwards Deming leads the group of practitioners advocating sole-source 
procurement.  Point Four of Deming’s celebrated Fourteen Points urges buyers to 
minimize total cost by working with a single supplier.  He states that “a long-term, tightly 
integrated, relationship with a sole source is the route to improved quality and lower total 
cost.”  (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995, p.71)  It has also been traditional Japanese 
practice to establish exclusive long-term relationships with a single supplier.  They argue 
that the added cost of establishing these relationships of increased buyer-supplier 
coordination will be more than offset by the reduced costs of rework, scrap, and warranty 
claims and the added benefit of higher-quality products.   
M. Porter leads the argument for competitive sourcing.  He recommends 
competing multiple sources against one another to “assure low price, high quality, and 
the lowest total cost.”  (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995, p.72).  Porter recommends the 
following: 
• Increase the buyer’s bargaining power by keeping the number of sources 
sufficient to ensure competition but small enough to be an important buyer to 
each source 
• Select suppliers who are especially competitive with each other and divide 
purchases between them  
• Vary over time the proportion of purchases awarded to suppliers to ensure 
they do not view it as an entitlement 
• Solicit occasional proposals from new suppliers in order to test market prices 
and gather technological intelligence  
Advocates of competitive sourcing claim the problem with investing so heavily in 
a sole source is that is increases the buyer’s dependence on the supplier.  The funds 
invested to establish the relationship are sunk costs which equate to switching costs that 
reduce the buyer’s ability to threaten the supplier with a loss of business.  With little or 
no competitive pressure, and without the threat of losing business, the suppliers can exert 




2. Competitive versus Sole-Source Procurements with Regard to Cost 
Savings 
Over the years, there have been numerous studies on the benefits of competitive 
procurements with specific regard to cost savings.  In his paper titled, “A Review of the 
Literature: Competition versus Sole-Source Procurements”, W.N. Washington attempts 
to gather and compare the results of these studies in order to draw useful conclusions for 
modern day acquisitions.  In researching the topic, he discovered two general categories 
of studies on the topic:  simple comparison studies and multiple factor analyses.  In the 
simple comparison studies, cost savings were consistently found associated with 
competition programs, although the amount of savings varied widely from 10 to 67 
percent.  Washington concludes that these studies are of limited value in assessing cost 
savings in competitive procurement because they “failed to take into account all the costs 
associated with the competition process, such as the cost of conducting the competition, 
setup costs for the new contractor, special tooling and government-furnished equipment, 
and the time value of money to set up the new contractor.”  (Washington, 1997, p.174)  
Even given these omissions, and the inconsistency of results between the studies, there 
did appear to be a general level of cost savings associated with competition, particularly, 
he found, regarding the procurement of spare parts.   
The second category of studies Washington examined, multiple factor analyses, 
were more comprehensive in their handling of the factors affecting procurement costs.  
Many of the studies he examined were master’s thesis from the Air Force Institute of 
Technology.  Unlike the earlier, simpler studies, these studies were less eager to declare 
grand estimates of cost savings associated with competition.  And in some instances, 
competition was not found to be beneficial.  The general conclusion was that cost savings 
in competitive procurements was dependent on many factors, including the maturity of 
the technology or system being acquired, the number of qualified suppliers, the 
complexity and scale of the item being acquired, and the size of the government’s 
purchase.  The studies also discovered several industrial base issues influencing 
production costs that should also be considered in the decision to pursue sole or 




stabilize design, capacity utilization, requirement for special production skills or 
facilities, and proprietary data rights.  (Washington, 1997)  In addition to these costs, the 
studies found several costs associated with competition that must be taken into account 
when determining if competitive sourcing will really save money.  These include: 
• Additional source selection costs incurred by both the government and the 
contractor 
• Second source development costs, such as special tooling and test equipment, 
and the cost of transferring technical data to the new source 
• Learning curve losses if quantities are split between several sources 
• Increased contract administration costs 
• Increased technical data administration costs incurred to maintain and update 
more than one source 
• Company-funded research and development costs that must be recaptured by 
the original developer 
Based on his research, Washington concluded the following.  First, there appears 
to be some rationale supporting competitive sourcing, but not all competitive 
procurements produce savings; and those that do seem to produce less than 25 percent 
savings.  Second, there are several factors that must be considered when choosing 
between sole and competitive sourcing.  These include production quantity, item 
complexity, capacity utilization of the industry involved, the requirement for special 
skills, and the maturity or availability of data regarding the item being procured.  Third, 
decision makers should perform a cost-benefit analysis before choosing competitive 
sourcing to determine if any real cost savings will result.  Finally, Washington concluded 
that competition is “probably the best choice for acquisition of low-dollar-value spare 
parts required in considerable quantity, or for component parts and systems that are 




3. The Effects of Sole-, Multiple-, and Parallel-Sourcing on Supplier 
Performance 
In their paper entitled, “Sole Sourcing, Competitive Sourcing, Parallel Sourcing: 
Mechanisms for Supplier Performance,” authors Richardson and Roumasset (1995) use 
an agency theory model to determine the conditions under which the three selected 
sourcing strategies appear to be superior.  The first strategy is the traditional sole-
sourcing strategy.  To represent competitive sourcing, the authors differentiate between 
multiple and parallel sourcing.  Multiple sourcing occurs when two or more sources 
compete against one another to supply the same item.  Parallel sourcing, which originated 
from Japanese practice, occurs when a firm simultaneously maintains a relationship with 
more than one supplier producing the same or similar items.  Normally only used by large 
buying firms, parallel sourcing’s appeal is that it appears to provide coordination and 
quality control benefits normally attributed to sole sourcing, while maintaining 
competitive pressures comparable to multiple sourcing.   
In their study, Richardson and Roumasset analyzed each sourcing strategy using 
agency cost theory.  This theory asserts that firms will organize in such a way as to 
minimize total agency costs.  In the realm of buyer-supplier relationships, agency costs 
refer to the costs associated with activities undertaken to ensure supplier performance, as 
well as the costs incurred if the supplier performs badly.  These activities include 
investment in the buyer-supplier relationship, monitoring performance, and administering 
rewards and penalties.  In their analysis, Richardson and Roumasset define the superior 
sourcing strategy as the “one that provides the lowest total agency costs and therefore the 
greatest profit to the buyer.”  (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995, p.74)  Adjustable 
parameters in their model included:  labor price, unit production cost, cost of 
coordination, cost of inspection, fixed setup cost, other setup costs, cost of handling 
returns, and fixed production costs. 
Richardson and Roumasset concluded that the best sourcing strategy depends on 
the situation and that increased buyer-supplier coordination combined with competition 




performance.  They found that no one method works in all circumstances, but they were 
able to make some general observations (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995): 
• When the priority is supplier performance (e.g. quality), parallel sourcing is 
superior to sole sourcing.  If setup (switching) costs are also high, multiple 
sourcing is also superior to sole sourcing.  In general, when poor supplier 
performance is even modestly costly, either parallel sourcing or multiple 
sourcing provides a higher level of supplier performance at a lower total cost.   
• The added costs of coordinating with more than one supplier are offset by the 
increased effectiveness resulting from competitive pressure.  Coordination 
combined with competition seems to be the most cost-effective mechanism for 
achieving high supplier performance. 
• In general, parallel sourcing is superior to multiple sourcing.  This is because 
parallel sourcing provides improved buyer-supplier coordination while still 
retaining the credible threat of lost business (i.e. switching to another 
supplier). 
• If high fixed setup costs cannot be avoided, the advantage may shift to sole 
sourcing.  This is because the high cost of setting up parallel or multiple 
suppliers may outweigh the advantages to be gained from competition.  The 
authors point out, however, that supplier performance (e.g. quality) in this sole 
sourcing scenario is unlikely to be superior to parallel or multiple sourcing.     
Although they seem to favor the competitive sourcing strategies, the authors 
pointed out three factors that, if present, would help ensure high quality performance 
from a sole source.  The first is “reputation effects” where a supplier may value a good 
reputation and as a result provide high performance in order to increase business with this 
or other potential buyers.  The second is a situation where the supplier is in a highly 
concentrated industry where they are extremely dependent on the buyer’s business.  
Finally, the sole-source supplier is likely to provide high quality performance if there is a 




buyer’s competitiveness, which in turn strongly influences the supplier’s business.  In 
other words, “if the supplier’s fortunes are strongly tied to the buyer’s, there may be an 
incentive for better performance.”  (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995, p.81) 
D.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
From the research reviewed in this section it is clear that competition has the 
potential to yield significant benefits in the acquisition of defense weapons systems.  The 
magnitude of the benefits, however, is highly dependent on several variables regarding 
the particular type of program, the political situation at the time, the state of the supplying 
industry, the contractors themselves, and the size and duration of the acquisition.  The 
conclusion drawn from the research that is more applicable here is that a cost-benefit 
analysis should be conducted to assess the real savings that can be obtained from the use 




III. METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A.   ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND DATA 
Two primary solutions are considered in this business case analysis.  The first is a 
sole-source scenario in which Pratt & Whitney is awarded a sole-source contract for the 
duration of the JSF program.  The second is a competitive scenario in which contracts 
will be awarded based on an annual competition approach starting in 2012.  Furthermore, 
since learning curve cost savings can be a significant factor in production costs, and since 
the amount of learning curve cost savings is dependent on the number of units produced, 
the specific competitive scenario evaluated is the “worst case” scenario of 50:50.  In 
other words, Pratt & Whitney produces an average of 50% of the aircraft engines and 
GE/Rolls-Royce the other 50%.  In the Sensitivities, Risks, and Conditions chapter, the 
competitive scenario of 70:30 is evaluated to determine the impact a learning rate 
advantage would have on the results.  The following table summarizes the scenarios 
examined in this analysis.   
 
Table 3.   Summary of Production Scenarios Considered 
 
Percentage of Production 
Scenario Description Pratt & Whitney GE/Rolls-Royce 
1 Sole-Source 100 0 
2 Competition – 50:50 50 50 









B. SCOPE OF THE CASE 
Data used in the computation of life-cycle costs was obtained from the JSF Joint 
Program Office (JPO) and from studies performed by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and Cost Analysis Improvement Group.  At 
the time of this study, the JSF JPO was preparing for LRIP contract negotiations with GE 
and Pratt & Whitney.  Due to the proprietary nature of the data used in the negotiations, 
the program office could not provide updated cost or learning curve estimates.  Where 
necessary, reasonable assumptions are made (e.g. the learning rate was estimated at five 
percent).  All assumptions are conservative in nature and are in keeping with those used 
in other studies.  All assumptions are clearly annotated.  The comparison of life-cycle 
costs offered here attempts to present the data in an unbiased manner using reasonable 
assumptions of industry and market behavior.   
C. FINANCIAL METRICS 
1. Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 
The production scenarios included in this analysis are compared using life-cycle 
cost (LCC) analysis.  LCC includes the total cost of the system and any relevant 
supporting activities throughout the system’s planned life cycle.  In the case of the 
alternate engine program, this includes all future costs associated with research, design 
and development, engine production, aircraft fielding, operation and support, and 
retirement and disposal.  Since the purpose is to compare the alternatives, rather than 
calculate a total cost, the cost factors that would be the same under either scenario are 
eliminated.  As a result, the scenarios are compared based on the following cost factors: 
• Remaining system development and demonstration costs 
• Production costs – including all recurring unit fly-away costs 






2. Learning Curve Savings 
The basic concept behind the learning curve is that as the total volume of units 
produced doubles, the cost per unit decreases by a constant percentage.  These cost 
reductions occur for several reasons, such as increased familiarization with production 
procedures, improvements in work flow, and improved tooling.  Although there are 
several conditions and situational factors that may affect the rate of learning, and hence 
the amount of cost savings generated, in general the more units that are produced, the 
more efficient production becomes.  In terms of the JSF engine program, in a sole-source 
arrangement one contractor will produce all of the engines.  By having all of the 
production activity, that contractor will achieve the highest achievable learning rate.  The 
more production is split between two contractors, the fewer number of engines each will 
produce, and hence the fewer number of engines each can “learn” from.  To represent 
these learning rate improvements in the life cycle cost comparison, a conservative five 
percent learning rate is used.   
3. Net Present Value 
The net present value of the life-cycle costs is computed to reflect the time value 
of money.  A discount rate of seven percent is used based on Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) guidance on conducting benefit-cost analysis of Federal Programs.  
(OMB, 2006)  Discount periods are in years to reflect the annual contract competition.   
D. MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are made during the calculation and comparison of 
life-cycle costs:   
• Sunk costs are not included in the comparison.  Most notably this includes 
monies already spent on system development and test.  Sunk costs are defined 
as those costs incurred through FY2007.   
• Calculated costs reflect U.S. only costs but include the production quantity 




learning rate savings are calculated based on 3089 engines.  This includes 
2443 engines for the U.S. aircraft, and 646 engines for the aircraft sold via 
foreign military sales.  Initial spares are included under initial standup costs.   
• For ease of comparison with other studies, dollar amounts reflect fiscal year 
(FY) 2002 dollars.   
• The engine production cost is $10.569 million in FY2007 dollars.  
(SAF/FMB, 2006)  When adjusted to FY2002 dollars, this amount is $9.12 
million.  This figure is used for both the F135 and F136 engines. 
• Initial standup costs include initial spares (assumed to be 15 percent), training, 
manpower, and depot standup. 
• The engine competition and its anticipated cost benefits begin in FY2012.   
• The percentage of savings due to competition was applied only to production 
costs.   
• For net present value calculations, a discount rate of seven percent is used.  
• Sustainment costs required to maintain fielded aircraft are based on engine 
flight hours costs and usage rates.  Sustainment costs are not considered 
because the number of aircraft and cost per flight hours would be the same 






IV. BUSINESS IMPACTS 
A. LIFE-CYCLE COST COMPARISON 
The DoD’s argument for cancelling the alternate engine program centers around 
an immediate cost savings of $1.4 billion, which is the approximate amount remaining on 
the SDD contract for that engine.1  However, when comparing the two production 
alternatives in terms of cost, the true additional cost of the alternate engine is higher than 
$1.4 billion.  In addition to the increased RDT&E costs associated with developing two 
engines rather than one, there are numerous other cost increases that would occur under 
the two-engine scenario.  Fielding one engine will require training, manpower, manuals, 
and the standup of maintenance depot(s) and an associated logistics supply line.  Fielding 
two engines will increase all of these cost elements.  Even if executed in the most 
streamlined and efficient manner, the increased cost of fielding two engines rather than 
one will be unavoidable.  To accurately compare the sole-source and competition 
scenarios, therefore, a life-cycle cost comparison is needed.   
While there are many cost factors to be considered when calculating a program’s 
life-cycle cost, for example RDT&E, production, initial standup, operation, sustainment, 
and disposal, the life-cycle cost comparison in this evaluation focuses on only those costs 
that will differ under a two-engine scenario.  Specifically, the cost elements included in 
the comparison are SDD, production, and initial standup costs.  Given that the number of 
aircraft and the cost per flight hour are the same under each scenario, differences in 
operation and sustainment costs should be inconsequential and are therefore not included.  
Similarly, disposal costs are not considered since the same number of engines will exist 
under each scenario.   
 
                                                 
1 Following SASC hearings in March 2006 regarding the cancellation of the alternate engine program, 
Congress added $408 million to the FY2007 budget to continue the program for another year.  (CRC 
RL33405, 2006)  At the time of the hearings, $1.8B remained on the SDD contract for that engine.  In this 




Table 4.  shows the estimated SDD, production, and initial standup costs for each 
scenario.  Again, the competition scenario is based on each engine team winning an 
average of 50 percent of the contract awards.  Tables showing the derivation of the 
production costs for each scenario are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Table 4.   Comparison of Costs between the Sole Source and Competition Scenarios 
 
Cost (FY02$B) F135 Sole-Source Competition (50:50) 
SDD (left to go) 1.00 2.40 
Production 16.77 17.65 
Initial Standup Costs 3.20 3.33 
TOTAL: 20.97 23.38 
DIFFERENCE:  + 2.41 (or 10.31%) 
    
  
It is often the case that investments made early in a program’s life-cycle result in 
savings many years, or even decades, later.  The F-35 engine, which has production 
currently planned out to 2034, will no doubt follow a similar pattern.  For that reason, a 
net present value (NPV) calculation is included to account for the time value of money.  
A comparison of the NPVs for each scenario is shown in Table 5.   
 
Table 5.   Comparison of Net Present Values (NPVs) 
 
NPV (FY02$B) F135 Sole-Source Competition (50:50) 
SDD (left to go) 0.85 2.03 
Production 6.94 7.31 
Initial Standup Costs 2.60 2.70 
TOTAL: 10.39 12.04 
DIFFERENCE:  + 1.65 (or 13.70%) 
  
  
As shown above, the competition alternative will cost approximately $2.41 billion 
more than the sole-source alternative.  The difference in SDD costs is directly related to 
the fact that two RDT&E efforts are required, one for each engine.  The increase in 
production costs stems from a loss of learning curve benefits if engine production is split 




each scenario, in the sole-source arrangement Pratt & Whitney will produce every engine, 
thus allowing the company to maximize the cost savings possible through learning rate 
improvements.  The more engine production is divided, the less each company can save 
through learning rate improvement.  This topic is discussed more under Non-Quantitative 
Costs.  Finally, the initial cost of standing up two engines will increase due to a 
requirement for two training programs, two sets of manuals, two depot standups, etc.   
Simply concluding, however, that the sole-source scenario will save the 
government $2.41 billion over the competition scenario, is not an accurate cost 
comparison of the two solutions.  As demonstrated during the Great Engine War, 
competition often leads to savings, particularly in the area of production.  Under the 
pressures of competition, each company will seek ways to reduce production costs in 
order to make itself more attractive in the next round of contract awards.  Therefore, to 
more accurately evaluate the two alternatives, some amount of savings must be 
incorporated into the computations.  It is particularly illustrative to calculate the 
percentage of savings necessary for the two solutions to breakeven.   
A breakeven analysis is shown in Appendix B.  In the analysis, a fixed percentage 
of savings is applied to each year’s production costs, then that amount is adjusted to 
account for the time value of money using a net present value calculation.  To find the 
breakeven point, the percentage of savings is adjusted to find the amount of savings 
required for the NPV of the competition solution to equal that of the sole-source solution.    
The result of the breakeven analysis is that a 26.45 percent savings is required for 
the two scenarios to be equal in terms of net present value.  According to interviews 
conducted with defense and industry experts by the Government Accountability Office, 
26.45 percent is at the top of the reasonable range of potential savings achievable through 
competition.  (GAO-07-656T, 2007)  For comparison, Table 6.  shows how the results 






Table 6.   The Effect of Savings Percentage on the NPC Comparison 
 
NPV($FY02B)2 Percent 
Savings (%) Sole-Source Competition (50:50)
Difference 
($B) 
0 10.39 12.04 1.65 
5 10.39 11.73 1.34 
10 10.39 11.41 1.02 
15 10.39 11.10 0.71 
20 10.39 10.79 0.40 
25 10.39 10.48 0.09 
26.45 10.39 10.39 0.00 
The takeaway from the life-cycle cost analysis is that an additional investment of 
$2.41 billion may be required as a result of the alternate engine program; however this 
investment can be largely, if not completely, recouped through the savings to be gained 
by the competition.     
B. NON-QUANTITATIVE BENEFITS 
1. International Relations 
To help achieve the JSF program goal of “affordability”, international 
participation and foreign military sales have been an integral part of the program from the 
beginning.  The eight international partners have pledged $4.6 billion towards the 
development of the JSF aircraft.  This equates to 10 percent of the total development 
costs.  The U.K., who is a level one partner on the program, has invested $2 billion of 
that international contribution, or 8 percent of the total development costs.  Israel and 
Singapore have both signed letters of intent to join the program and contribute $50 
million, while Poland is reportedly considering a foreign military sales investment of $75 
to $100 million in the JSF program.  (Bolkcom, Apr 2006) 
a. International Alliances 
The importance of maintaining a good relationship with our international 
partners is particularly significant in today’s defense environment.  The continuing trend 
                                                 




towards downsizing in the U.S. industrial base means increased reliance on foreign 
technology in the future; the same holds true for our partners.  The JSF program offers 
opportunities to advance our alliances, most notably by awarding work on the F-35 to 
foreign companies.   
Some friction already exists between the DoD and several of the JSF 
foreign partners over the quality and quantity of work that has been awarded to their 
companies; in particular Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey have 
expressed their dissatisfaction.  (Bolkcom, Apr 2006)  Not surprisingly, the U.K. is upset 
over the proposed cancellation of the F136 alternate engine which is being co-produced 
by GE and the British company, Rolls-Royce.   
The U.K. is dissatisfied with canceling the second engine for a few 
reasons.  First, although they are a level one partner on the program and have contributed 
$2 billion, they were not consulted about the engine decision.  (Procurement, 2007)  
Second, the F136 engine, which is three years behind the Pratt & Whitney engine in 
development, will likely have greater thrust.  This would be particularly beneficial in the 
short-takeoff, vertical landing JSF models the U.K. will be buying.  Finally, the 
GE/Rolls-Royce partnership could be worth billions of dollars in sales for British 
companies over the 20 year production run.  (Procurement, 2007)   
U.K. officials expressed their frustration to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in March 2006.  Lord Peter Drayson, the U.K. military procurement chief, 
even went so far as to warn that his country “would not buy any of the aircraft unless it 
had the technology the British needed to fight on their terms.”  (Cahlink, 2006)  This 
highlights an issue relevant to all the partner nations--namely that they have invested 
their money in the program and expect in return an aircraft that will meet their unique 
needs and allow them to fight on their own terms.  Providing a choice of engines is one 






b. Foreign Military Sales 
The benefits of an engine competition also extend to foreign military sales.  
This is evidenced by the fact that 20 years after the great engine war, competitive 
pressures still exist and are influencing sales of F-15 and F-16 engines in the international 
market.  For example, although U.S. F-15s are powered by Pratt & Whitney F100 
engines, in 2002 South Korea selected the GE engine to power its F-15 fleet, and in 2005 
Singapore followed suit, selecting the GE engine over the Pratt & Whitney model.  
Similarly, while GE engines power a large proportion of U.S. F-16s, Pratt & Whitney has 
dominated engine sales to international F-16 customers.  (Bolkcom, Apr 2006)   
The benefits of having more than one engine source are threefold.  First, 
international customers reap the same competitive benefits, reduced operational risk, 
increased performance, improved readiness, and lower costs.  This makes the aircraft 
more attractive and therefore more exportable.  Second, the foreign customer has the 
ability to choose the engine that best suits the mission and operational scenario in which 
they will utilize the aircraft.  This again makes the aircraft more attractive to potential 
customers.  Finally, both the U.S. industrial base and DoD continue to benefit as the 
advantages gained through competition are perpetuated thanks to foreign sales.   
2. Industrial Base 
 While in the past there existed four or five major U.S. producers capable of 
providing aircraft and engines, today only Pratt & Whitney and GE manufacturer fighter 
aircraft engines.  If the alternate engine for the JSF is cancelled, Pratt &Whitney will 
receive a sole-source contract that could be worth over $100 billion over the life of the 
JSF program.  (DeWine)  Moreover, the cancellation would effectively create a “winner 
take all” scenario, not only for the JSF program, but potentially for any future tactical 
aircraft engine program. Reducing the industrial base to only one supplier may have long-
term effects on both the industry and national security.    
 GE currently dominates in the commercial aircraft engine market, with 50 percent 




tanker aircraft, helicopters, and large unmanned aerial vehicle programs.  In other words, 
the company will not go out of business if the alternate engine program is cancelled.  
However, when it comes to tactical aircraft engines its prospects are much more limited.  
The company currently builds and maintains engines for the Navy’s F/A-18E/F, and 
supports the F110 engine series for domestic and international F-15 and F-16 customers.  
However, production in these fighter engine programs is on the decline.   
 For all practical purposes, there is only one fighter engine program now and for 
the foreseeable future—the JSF engine program.  Before very long, if a company is not 
involved in the JSF engine program, it will not be involved in the fighter engine business.  
And while commercial engines have some similar qualities with fighter engines, they are 
very different.  For example, commercial engines are generally designed for fuel 
efficiency, not performance.  They do not use afterburners and their thrust-to-weight 
ratios are very different from fighter engines.  Therefore, to produce and maintain a 
fighter engine requires a team of engineers and scientists tailored for that purpose.  If the 
F136 engine is cancelled, there is no rationale for GE to sustain the unique capabilities 
and resources needed to design, develop, test and produce high-performance fighter 
engines; a fact they expressed to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March of 
2006.   
 If the alternate engine program were cancelled, and then sometime in the future 
the DoD requested GE to design and build an alternate engine for the JSF, GE would face 
many challenges and incur much expense to reinstate the program.  The F136 engine 
program currently trails the F135 engine program by three years.  This lead would grow 
with every year that GE was out of the business.  (Bolkcom, Apr 2006)  GE also has no 
other engine in the same thrust class from which to pull resources and expertise.  
Essentially, it would have to rebuild the team of engineers and resources, at great expense 
to the DoD.   
 The bottom-line is that relying on a sole engine supplier for the JSF aircraft, 
which is a single-engine airplane designed for multiple missions for use by multiple 




Investing a relatively small amount now in an alternate engine may reap large benefits in 
the future and help guarantee a healthy and competitive industrial base capable of 
providing the DoD with the competitive benefits of lower costs, increased performance, 
reduced operational risk, improved readiness, and increased foreign military sales.     
3. Reliability and Performance  
In addition to cost savings, the great engine war is credited with increasing engine 
reliability, improving performance, and increasing military value.  Many critics have 
argued that while there were benefits of the F-16 engine competition, the industry and 
technological factors that existed at that time, which made the competition successful, are 
not present today.  One area, in particular, that is frequently cited as the reason that 
competing the engines is unnecessary is reliability and performance.  Specifically, that 
engine reliability and performance in general have improved significantly from what they 
were back then.  In fact, the F-16 mishap rate has dropped from ten per 100,000 hours in 
1996 to one per 100,000 hours is 2006.  (SASC, 2006)  Given this, they argue that any 
gain to be achieved through competition with regards to reliability and performance will 
be small and therefore not worth the investment.  In this section, that argument is 
analyzed and ultimately refuted.     
a. Sole-Sourcing Will Create Unprecedented Vulnerability 
The F-35 program has been hailed as the largest DoD acquisition program 
to date, both in terms of dollar value and number of participating services and partner 
nations.  With the planned U.S. purchase at 2458 aircraft, and foreign sales already 
predicted over 2150 aircraft, there is the potential for F-35 production to top 5000 
aircraft.  This far exceeds production quantities of all other U.S. aircraft platforms.  Table 
7.  shows production quantities for several recent aircraft programs.  Only the F-16 comes 
close to the production magnitude of the F-35 program and only after all four F-16 
variants and foreign F-16 sales are combined.3  The F-35 program is often compared to 
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the F-22 program, but in fact the size of the two programs (2458 versus 183 aircraft) is 
vastly different.  While critics argue that any reliability and performance gains will be 
small compared to those during the great engine war, when taken in proportion to the size 
of the F-35 program, those gains may result in billions of dollars of savings over the life 
of the program.   
Table 7.   Aircraft Production Quantities 
 
Aircraft Production Quantity (for U.S. Only) 
F-35 2458 
F-16 C/D 1421 
F-16 A/B 795 
F/A-18E/F 494 
C-130 AMP 465 
F-15 C 408 
F-15 A/B 360 
F-15 E 203 
C-17 190 
F-22A 183 
F-15 D 61 
From: 1. GAO-06-391, 2006.  2. www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-16.htm.  3. Bolkcom, 2007.  4. 
www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-15.htm.  5. Bolkcom, 2007.  6. www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ac/f-15.htm. 
Traditionally, the U.S. and its allies have relied on several aircraft 
platforms to meet their tactical airpower needs.  A benefit of that approach is that if a 
problem is encountered that results in the grounding of a particular fleet of aircraft, there 
are other platforms available with similar capabilities that could, at least temporarily, fill 
the void.  This may not be possible to the same extent under the JSF and F-22 programs.  
Collectively, the two aircraft have been designed to replace several aircraft types, 
including the F-16, F-15, F/A-18, A-10, A-6, and AV-8B.  By 2030, the JSF and F-22 
will represent 85% of U.S. and allied tactical airpower.  (SASC, 2006)  This creates a 
vulnerability that is unprecedented.  Since both the F135 and the F-22’s F119 engine are 
currently produced by Lockheed Martin, cancelling the F136 program will leave the U.S. 
and its allies dependent on one engine source.  Further, since the F135 engine is a 
derivative of the F119 engine, a problem in the basic engine design could potentially 




the magnitude of the consequences of failure, spending $1.8 billion to develop an 
alternate engine seems well worth the expense.   
b. Too Early to Forecast F135 Reliability 
To help ensure and predict an engine’s reliability, aircraft programs 
conduct many thousands of hours of ground and flight testing.  Based on the testing 
conducted to date, DoD officials have asserted that the reliability of the F135 engine has 
now been sufficiently demonstrated and the operational risks reduced to the extent they 
can reasonable predict the success of the F135 engine, and defend the decision to cancel 
the alternate engine program.  However, looking more closely at the amount of testing 
that has been conducted on the F135 engine it is too early to forecast the engine’s 
reliability.  At the time of DoD’s decision to cancel the alternate engine program, the 
F135 engine had undergone 4,600 hours of ground testing, which is roughly one-third of 
the planned ground test hours.  In addition, at the time of the decision, the F-35 aircraft 
had not yet flown.  The first dedicated operational testing that will accurately measure the 
JSF aircraft’s operational effectiveness and suitability is not even planned until 2011.  
(Sullivan, 2006)  Figure 1.  shows that propulsion performance flight testing does not 
start in earnest until 2009.  Based on this it can be concluded that placing a high level of 






Figure 1.   Planned Propulsion Performance Flight Testing and First Flight for the Three 
JSF Variants (From: GAO-06-391, 2006) 
 
c. Comparisons to F-22 Engine of Limited Value 
The predicted reliability of the F135 engine is frequently based on 
comparisons with the F-22’s F119 engine, of which it is a derivative and shares up to 
70% commonality.4  Proponents of a sole-source scenario point out that in 12 years, the 
F119 engine has undergone 42,000 hours of ground and flight testing, and 16,000 hours 
of operational time with no engine-related losses and no groundings due to engine-related 
problems.  (SASC, 2006)  They further predict that the F135 propulsion system will have 
a 30% to 50% improvement in reliability and safety compared to the F119.  (England, 
2006)  Comparisons with the F119 engine, however, are premature and possibly 
                                                 
4 Lockheed Martin claims 70% commonality between the F119 and F135 engines; however officials at 
Rolls-Royce, who is co-producing the F136 engine with GE, disagree with this assessment claiming instead 
that it is more like a new engine than a derivative.  They feel this is corroborated by the fact that Lockheed 
Martin is spending $4 to $5 billion to develop the F135 engine, versus $3.7 billion by GE/Rolls-Royce to 




misleading for two primary reasons.  First, the F119 engine has not yet reached maturity, 
and second, the two engines will be used under different operational scenarios.   
DoD officials have argued that the good performance of the F-22’s F119 
engine has sufficiently reduced the risk that would be incurred in relying on a single 
source for the F-35’s engine.  Even if the claim of 70% commonality between the two 
engines is accepted, the F119 engine has not yet reached maturity.  The F-22 has 
completed approximately 20,000 operational engine hours, which represents only 10% of 
the 200,000 hours typically considered sufficient for system maturity.  (Sullivan, 2006)  
As a point of comparison, when the great engine war commenced, the Pratt & Whitney 
F100 engine had already accumulated 2,000,000 hours of operational service (100 times 
more than the F119).  (Bolkcom, 2006)  Moreover, even with this extensive number of 
hours, numerous improvements in engine reliability and performance were attained 
during the 25 year competition.   
In addition, while performance of the F119 has been good, the engine is 
not currently meeting several reliability goals.  For example, the engine’s mean time 
between maintenance actions was expected to be 100 hours at its initial service release in 
2002.  However, as of April 2006, the engine was averaging only 60 hours between 
maintenance actions.  The performance requirement at system maturity in 2010 is 200 
hours mean time between maintenance actions, however F-22 program engine officials 
predict the engine will achieve only 100 hours between maintenance actions--50% of the 
performance requirement.  (Sullivan, 2006)  
Comparing the F-22 and F-35 engines is also misleading because the two 
aircraft have distinctly different missions and will be flown under different operational 
scenarios.  First, there are three versions of the F-35, each with different operational 
concepts.  Second, the F-35 is being designed to rapidly transition between different air-
to-surface and air-to-air missions while still airborne.  Conversely, the F-22 will primarily 
serve as an air-to-air platform, flying at high speed and high altitude.  Based on what is 




considerably less stress on its engine.  Therefore, comparisons of the two aircraft engines 
must be qualified to put the association in proper context.      
d. Lessons Learned from Other Aircraft Programs 
Comparisons made between the F-35 and the F-22 and F/A-18E/F, both of 
which have only one engine source, may also be inappropriate because the latter aircraft 
are equipped with two engines, while the F-35 will have one engine.  History has shown 
that single engine aircraft are inherently subject to higher risk than two-engine aircraft.  
For example, between FY1990 and FY2004, the single-engine F-16 experienced 80 Class 
A engine-related mishaps.  That equates to a mishap rate of 1.31 per 100,000 flight hours.  
The two-engine F-15, on the other hand, experienced 21 Class A engine-related mishaps 
during that same period, for a rate of 0.64 per 100,000 flight hours.  (Bolkcom, Apt 2006)   
Adding to the complexity, the F-35’s STOVL variant will be capable of 
short and/or vertical takeoff and landings.  To achieve this, the F-35 engine will be 
augmented with a lift fan, roll posts, drive shaft, and three bearing swivel module.  The 
engine will be subject to different operational stresses and conditions.  Its nearest 
equivalent is the AV-8 Harrier, which has one of the highest mishap rates of all military 
aircraft.  Moreover, unlike most aircraft types where mishaps are most frequently related 
to human error, two-thirds of the Harrier’s mishaps have been related to aircraft failures.  
(Bolkcom, Apr 2006)   
e. Engine Maturity Reflected in Contract Type 
The DoD’s confidence and the prime contractor’s assurance that the F135 
is little more than a derivative of the F119 engine, are belied by the choice of contract 
type being used for the acquisition.  Specifically, the initial production F-35 engines will 
be purchased using a cost reimbursement type contract.  According to FAR Subpart 16.3, 
cost reimbursement contracts are “suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in 
contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use 




f. F136 Design Changes Easier to Incorporate 
In any program involving the design and development of a product or 
system, it is generally accepted that changes to the system’s design are easier and less 
expensive to incorporate when they are made early in the program.  The later design 
changes are made in the life of a program, the most costly they become, both in terms of 
dollars and schedule delays.  This time-tested fact is another advantage of the F136 
engine, whose development is approximately three years behind the F135 engine.  Based 
on lessons learned from the F135 engine, program managers may desire to make changes 
in hopes of increasing thrust or improving operational reliability.  Similarly, if weight 
growth continues to be an issue for the F-35’s STOVL variant, the DoD may wish to 
counter it with increased engine/propulsion capabilities.  Relatively speaking, 
accommodating changes in the engine’s design will be easier and less expensive with the 
F136 engine than with the F135.   
4. Cost Control 
Considering the magnitude of the JSF program, where the engine procurement 
costs alone may exceed $100 billion over the life of the program, failure to control costs 
could be devastating to the nation’s purse strings and negatively affect Congress’s ability 
to fund the programs necessary to provide adequately and effectively for the nation’s 
defense.  History has shown that when competition exists, contractors put significant 
energy into reducing and controlling costs.  This is a fact that has not gone unnoticed in 
Washington.  During the March 2006 Senate hearings on the alternate engine program, 
Senator John Warner, the senior Republican member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, stated that, “a competitive environment is essential in the judgment of many 
of us to the Government’s ability to control costs, especially in a program of the 
magnitude of the JSF.”  (SASC, 2006)   
Many believe that the cost savings to be gained through competition of the F-35 
engines could range from 10 to 20 percent.  (Sullivan, 2007)  Taking the conservative 




the life of the program.  Even Pratt & Whitney, an obvious supporter of a sole-source 
arrangement, publically disclosed that they believe there were $3 billion saved during the 
Great Engine War as a result of the competition.  (SASC, 2006)  The bottom-line is that 
even by the most conservative estimates, the savings that can be gained on a program of 
this great magnitude more than overcomes the short-term investment required to develop 
a second engine.   
C. NON-QUANTITATIVE COST  
1. Logistics Support 
The F135 and F136 engines are specifically designed to have identical external 
interfaces to the JSF aircraft, making them interchangeable in terms of form, fit, and 
function.  Internally, however, the two engines differ significantly and have many unique 
parts, including fans, turbines, combustors, and compressors.  As a result, supporting and 
maintaining two engines will require more resources and funding, than supporting only 
one.  Two separate spares pipelines will be required, along with two separate 
maintenance depot capabilities. Additional training, engine manuals, tools, and test 
equipment will also be required to maintain two engines.  Future configuration changes to 
the aircraft and/or engine will be more complex and may involve compromises in the 
design solution to accommodate both engines.  Finally, the costs of engineering and 
software support will be higher.  All in all, in the area of logistics support, a sole-source 
arrangement has the advantage both in terms of the amount of resources required for 
support and maintenance, and the simplicity of life-cycle management. 
 D. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES  
Table 8.   provides a summary comparison of the quantitative and qualitative 







Table 8.   Summary Comparison of the Sole-Source and Competition Alternatives 
 
ADVANTAGE: 




Life-Cycle Costs √  
An additional investment of 
$2.41 billion may be required 
as a result of the alternate 
engine program, however this 
investment can be largely, if 
not completely, recouped 
through the savings to be 
gained by the competition. 
International 
Alliances  √ 
The U.K. is a level one JSF 
partner and has contributed 
8% of JSF development costs.  
There is the potential for 
billions of dollars in sales for 
British companies via the 
GE/Rolls-Royce partnership 
on the F136 engine.   
Foreign Military 
Sales  √ 
Having a choice of engines 
makes the aircraft more 
attractive to foreign customers 
who will be able to choose the 
engine that best suits their 
operational needs and 
doctrine.    
Industrial Base  √ 
The JSF engine is the only 
tactical fighter engine 
program planned for the 
foreseeable future.  Cancelling 
the second engine reduces the 
number of tactical engine 
suppliers to one.  This creates 
an undesirable level of risk 














The JSF program is of 
unprecedented size.  Relying 
on a sole-source increases the 
reliability and performance 
risk of the engine.  The F135 
engine is based on the F-22 
engine which is still immature 
and not meeting its reliability 
goals.  Comparisons to F-22 
and F/A-18 aircraft also 
invalid due to differing 
missions and number of 
engines per aircraft.   
Cost Control  √ 
When the magnitude of the 
JSF program is put in 
proportion, poor cost control 
could be devastating and 
negatively affect Congress’s 
ability to fund other programs 
necessary for national 
security.  History has shown 
that cost control is most 
effective in a competitive 
environment.      
Logistics 
Support √  
Supporting and maintaining 
two engines is more complex 
and requires more resources 
and funding.  In a sole-source 
scenario, only one logistics 
pipeline and deport 
maintenance capability is 
required; one type of tools and 
manuals; one type of training; 































V. SENSITIVITIES, RISKS, AND CONTINGENCIES 
One clear conclusion from this and the other studies of its kind is that the 
financial advantage of one solution over another can change depending on the factors 
considered and assumptions made.  Some of these factors include the learning rate, the 
cost of producing the engine, discount factors and inflation rates, and the number of 
engines included in the computation.  In this study, all of those factors were based on 
open-source data, dictated by DoD mandates regarding BCA analysis, or chosen to 
facilitate comparison with other studies.   
One factor that is particularly difficult to predict, and is therefore worthy of 
additional analysis, is the net percentage of contract awards each engine team will 
ultimately win.  This study has thus far examined the 100:0 case in which Pratt & 
Whitney produces 100 percent of the engines (i.e., the sole-source scenario), as well as 
the 50:50 case in which each engine team averages 50 percent of the contract awards.  To 
examine the sensitivity of this factor, the 70:30 case is useful.  The life-cycle cost, NPV, 
and breakeven results for the 70:30 case are provided in Table 9.  .  Two sets of results 
are provided: one for the case that Pratt & Whitney produces 70 percent of the engines 
(labeled Competition 70:30), and one for the case that the GE/Rolls-Royce team produces 
70 percent (labeled Competition 30:70).  Data from the sole-source and 50:50 cases are 
included for reference.   
 
Table 9.   Total Cost and NPV Data for each Production Scenario 
Case Total Cost ($B)* NPV ($B) 
Savings Required  
to Breakeven (%) 
Sole-Source (100:0) 20.97 10.39 n/a 
Competition (50:50) 23.38 12.04 26.45 
Competition (PW 70:GE/RR 30) 23.29 12.00 26.00 
Competition (PW 30:GE/RR 70) 23.31 12.01 26.15 
Average of competition results: 23.33 12.02 26.20 
Variance of competition results: 0.0022 0.00043 0.053 
Standard deviation of competition results: 0.047 0.021 0.23 
*Total cost = Sum of remaining SDD, production, and initial standup costs 




As shown in Table 9.  , there is little variation between the 50:50 case and the two 
70 percent scenarios.  Based on this limited analysis, it can be reasonably predicted that 
the percentage of engine production awarded does not significantly impact the 
comparison of life-cycle costs and breakeven savings requirements until it approaches the 
sole-source scenario.  Similarly, it is implied that the magnitude of learning rate savings 
is not significantly affected until the sole-source case.  In other words, the “competition 






VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The recommendation of this BCA is to continue to fund and execute the alternate 
engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter.  This recommendation is based on the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis performed in this study, which is summarized below.   
This study finds that the alternate engine program requires an additional 
investment of $2.41 billion over the sole-source scenario.  This investment, which 
includes the remaining RDT&E work, production costs, and initial standup costs, can be 
largely recouped, however, through the savings that can be gained during the course of 
competition.  As demonstrated during the Great Engine War, competition is most 
effective on programs with high total volume over the life of the program and high 
annual production rates; a depiction that perfectly characterizes the F-35 engine program.  
Beyond the comparison of life-cycle costs, there are several key qualitative 
factors that must be considered to fully assess the value of the alternate engine program.  
These include the following:   
• International Alliances and Foreign Military Sales:  Unlike most other DoD 
programs, the JSF program relies on several key international alliances.   
Competition strengthens these alliances, without which the program could 
lose valuable development funding and foreign military sales.   
• Industrial Base:  The JSF engine is the only tactical fighter engine program 
planned for the foreseeable future.  Cancelling the second engine reduces the 
number of tactical engine suppliers to one, creating undesirable risk given the 
magnitude of the JSF program.   
• Reliability and Performance:  The JSF program is of unprecedented size.  
Relying on a sole engine producer increases the reliability and performance 
risk of the engine.  Moreover, the F135 engine is based on the F-22 engine 




decisions to cancel the F136 engine on comparisons to the F-22 engine is not 
prudent.    
• Cost Control:  History has shown that cost control is most effective in 
competitive environments.  Considering the magnitude of the JSF program, 
poor cost control could be devastating and negatively affect Congress’s ability 
to fund other programs required for the nation’s defense.   
The bottom line is that even though the alternate engine requires an additional 
investment of $2.41 billion, most of that investment will likely be recouped, and the 
benefits to be gained through increased engine reliability and performance, increased 
foreign military sales, strengthened international alliances, a strengthened industrial base, 
and improved cost control more than outweigh the arguments against the alternate engine 
program.  If executed carefully, using proper oversight and keeping in mind lessons 
learned from the Great Engine War, the F-35 engine program can be both effective and 





APPENDIX A:  LIFE-CYCLE COST COMPARISON   
Sole‐Source Production Scenario
Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 126 127 126
Cumulative # of Engines 557 684 810
Cost ($Million) 96.89026 344.4375 385.9241 452.1073 631.7687 796.1696 726.2554 719.7282 704.2996
Discounted Cost ($Million) 90.55165 300.845 315.029 344.9105 450.4423 530.5214 452.2753 418.8883 383.0923
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 127 126 127 126 127 126 127 126 127
Cumulative # of Engines 937 1063 1190 1316 1443 1569 1696 1822 1949
Cost ($Million) 701.7064 689.2399 688.609 677.824 678.3563 668.6578 669.9531 661.0161 662.8467
Discounted Cost ($Million) 356.7119 327.4529 305.7506 281.2728 263.0783 242.3523 226.9363 209.2608 196.1124
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 126 127 126 127 126 127 126 127 126
Cumulative # of Engines 2075 2202 2328 2455 2581 2708 2834 2961 3087
Cost ($Million) 654.4744 656.6986 648.7625 651.2869 643.6985 646.4581 639.1539 642.102 635.0347











Data Source: LRIP engine quantities obtained from 461 FLTS F-35 Capabilities Brief (2006)   
50:50 Competition Production Scenario
Pratt & Whitney (50%)
Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 64 63 63
Cumulative # of Engines 310 373 436
Cost ($Million) 96.89026 344.4375 198.5856 232.0257 326.8823 411.066 384.8864 373.1341 368.4827
Discounted Cost ($Million) 90.55165 300.845 162.105 177.0113 233.0625 273.9106 239.6879 217.1674 200.4302
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 63 63 64 63 63 63 63 64 63
Cumulative # of Engines 499 562 626 689 752 815 878 942 1005
Cost ($Million) 364.5539 361.1579 363.8335 355.4661 353.0673 350.884 348.8818 352.5279 345.2918
Discounted Cost ($Million) 185.3207 171.5835 161.5464 147.5058 136.9256 127.1765 118.1783 111.6013 102.1594
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 63 63 63 64 63 63 63 63 64
Cumulative # of Engines 1068 1131 1194 1258 1321 1384 1447 1510 1574
Cost ($Million) 343.6935 342.1963 340.7885 344.8383 338.1842 336.9928 335.8596 334.7792 339.0367
















Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 64 63 63
Cumulative # of Engines 249 312 375
Cost ($Million) 0 0 220.9383 247.2215 339.8822 428.0025 392.0368 378.6189 372.9726
Discounted Cost ($Million) 0 0 180.3514 188.6041 242.3313 285.1961 244.1408 220.3596 202.8724
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 63 63 64 63 63 63 63 64 63
Cumulative # of Engines 438 501 565 628 691 754 817 881 944
Cost ($Million) 368.3481 364.4387 366.7634 358.0368 355.3862 352.9949 350.8178 354.3424 346.949
Discounted Cost ($Million) 187.2495 173.1422 162.8473 148.5726 137.8249 127.9416 118.8341 112.1757 102.6497
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 63 63 63 64 63 63 63 63 64
Cumulative # of Engines 1007 1070 1133 1197 1260 1323 1386 1449 1513
Cost ($Million) 345.2394 343.6445 342.1503 346.1429 339.399 338.1455 336.956 335.8245 340.0507
































APPENDIX B:  BREAKEVEN ANALYSIS 
BREAKEVEN ANALYSIS (50:50 Scenario)
SOLE SOURCE Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Goal: NPV Sole Source = NPV Competition (50:50)
SDD 1 0.85 By changing the percentage of savings achieved during
Production 16.77346 6.943604 production due to competition. 
Initial Support Cost 3.2 2.6
TOTAL 20.97346 10.3936 0.25
INTIAL
Competition (50:50) Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Cost ($B) NPV ($B)
SDD 2.4 2.03 2.4 2.03
Production 17.65373 7.305257 13.57532 5.75381
Initial Support Cost 3.33 2.7 3.33 2.7













Sole Source Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Goal: NPV Sole Source = NPV Competition (70:30)
SDD 1 0.85 By changing the percentage of savings achieved during
Production 16.77346 6.943604 production due to competition. 
Initial Support Cost 3.2 2.6
TOTAL 20.97346 10.3936 0.260048
INTIAL
Competition (70:30) Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Cost ($B) NPV ($B)
SDD 2.4 2.03 2.4 2.03
Production 17.5564 7.267615 13.33938 5.6636
Initial Support Cost 3.33 2.7 3.33 2.7













Sole Source Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Goal: NPV Sole Source = NPV Competition (30:70)
SDD 1 0.85 By changing the percentage of savings achieved during
Production 16.77346 6.943604 production due to competition. 
Initial Support Cost 3.2 2.6
TOTAL 20.97346 10.3936 0.261535
INTIAL
Competition (30:70) Cost ($B) NPV ($B) Cost ($B) NPV ($B)
SDD 2.4 2.03 2.4 2.03
Production 17.57569 7.280031 13.32952 5.6636
Initial Support Cost 3.33 2.7 3.33 2.7





























APPENDIX C:  ANALYSIS OF SEVENTY PERCENT PRODUCTION CASE 
70:30 Competition Production Scenario
Pratt & Whitney (70%)
Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 89 88 89
Cumulative # of Engines 384 472 561
Cost ($Million) 96.89026 344.4375 198.5856 232.0257 456.7803 576.4227 527.4156 512.5928 511.2434
Discounted Cost ($Million) 90.55165 300.845 162.105 177.0113 325.678 384.0948 328.4479 298.3337 278.0825
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 88 89 88 89 88 89 88 89 88
Cumulative # of Engines 649 738 826 915 1003 1092 1180 1269 1357
Cost ($Million) 499.6086 500.203 490.2033 491.8547 482.8548 485.1619 476.8395 479.5883 471.757
Discounted Cost ($Million) 253.9757 237.6428 217.6561 204.1022 187.2594 175.845 161.522 151.8254 139.5759
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 89 88 89 88 89 88 89 88 89
Cumulative # of Engines 1446 1534 1623 1711 1800 1888 1977 2065 2154
Cost ($Million) 474.8205 467.3628 470.66 463.4968 466.9731 460.0488 463.6655 456.9392 460.6686
















Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 38 38 38
Cumulative # of Engines 174 212 250
Cost ($Million) 0 0 220.9383 247.2215 204.3339 256.6354 238.6027 234.7569 231.6536
Discounted Cost ($Million) 0 0 180.3514 188.6041 145.6872 171.007 148.5898 136.6306 126.0042
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Cumulative # of Engines 288 326 364 402 440 478 516 554 592
Cost ($Million) 229.0574 226.8289 224.8792 223.1477 221.5917 220.1799 218.8883 217.6987 216.5966
Discounted Cost ($Million) 116.4412 107.7648 99.84904 92.59836 85.9371 79.80331 74.14504 68.91784 64.08312
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37
Cumulative # of Engines 630 668 706 744 782 820 858 896 933
Cost ($Million) 215.5704 214.6104 213.7091 212.8597 212.0569 211.2959 210.5727 209.8839 203.7286
















Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 38 38 38
Cumulative # of Engines 236 274 312
Cost ($Million) 96.89026 344.4375 198.5856 232.0257 195.8521 248.6021 232.7282 229.9651 227.6136
Discounted Cost ($Million) 90.55165 300.845 162.105 177.0113 139.6398 165.6541 144.9314 133.8418 123.8067
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Cumulative # of Engines 350 388 426 464 502 540 578 616 654
Cost ($Million) 225.5694 223.7632 222.1468 220.6849 219.3514 218.1261 216.9933 215.9403 214.9569
Discounted Cost ($Million) 114.668 106.3083 98.63582 91.57639 85.06826 79.05894 73.50313 68.36116 63.59799
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37
Cumulative # of Engines 692 730 768 806 844 882 920 958 995
Cost ($Million) 214.0348 213.167 212.3476 211.5717 210.835 210.1339 209.4652 208.8261 202.7424
















Fiscal Yr 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# Engines Produced 89 88 89
Cumulative # of Engines 322 410 499
Cost ($Million) 0 0 220.9383 247.2215 473.6396 589.0555 535.393 518.5825 516.114
Discounted Cost ($Million) 0 0 180.3514 188.6041 337.6985 392.5125 333.4159 301.8197 280.7318
Fiscal Yr 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Year 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
# Engines Produced 88 89 88 89 88 89 88 89 88
Cumulative # of Engines 587 676 764 853 941 1030 1118 1207 1295
Cost ($Million) 503.6269 503.6846 493.2106 494.5525 485.2495 487.3578 478.8242 481.436 473.4487
Discounted Cost ($Million) 256.0184 239.2969 218.9914 205.2217 188.1881 176.6409 162.1943 152.4103 140.0764
Fiscal Yr 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Year 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
# Engines Produced 89 88 89 88 89 88 89 88 89
Cumulative # of Engines 1384 1472 1561 1649 1738 1826 1915 2003 2092
Cost ($Million) 476.413 468.835 472.0576 464.7986 468.2172 461.2145 464.7857 457.994 461.6865
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